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bstract
ow do companies and government interactions affect business groups’ decisions on growth? So far, empirical evidence is based on qualitative
ata that do not explain how political strategies affect the expansion or diversification of business groups. Our main contribution is to discuss the
onditions that affect their growth. To do this, we conducted an in-depth field study in six business groups, and examined 17 growth decisions. Four
ategories (origin of growth, historical relationships, business group’s scope and use of specific political strategies) emerged from the analysis,
ased on interviews with managers and on 480 secondary data sources. We further applied the qualitative comparative method to test our categories
s conditions for growth. We found that a historical relationship between the group and the government is a necessary but insufficient condition
or growth through diversification. To foresee diversification, historical relationship must be aligned with government’s political interest, or with
he use of one or a combination of specific political tactics. We found no set of variables that can fully explain growth through expansion.
 2017 Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP.
ublished by Elsevier Editora Ltda. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
eywords: Business groups; Political strategy; Diversification
esumo
omo as interac¸ões entre as firmas e governo afetam as decisões de crescimento dos business  groups? Evidências empíricas existentes não explicam
omo as estratégias políticas afetam a expansão ou diversificac¸ão dos business  groups. A principal contribuic¸ão é discutir as condic¸ões que afetam
 crescimento dos business  groups. Para responder isso foi realizado um estudo de campo em profundidade em seis grupos empresariais e foi
nalisado 17 exemplos de crescimento desses seis business  groups. Quatro categorias emergiram a partir das entrevistas com diretores e presidentes
 480 fontes de dados secundários (categorias: origem de crescimento, relacionamento histórico, escopo do business  group  e estratégia política
specífica). Foi aplicado o método QCA para testar as categorias como sendo condic¸ões para o crescimento. Descobrimos que ter uma relac¸ão
istórica entre o grupo empresarial e o governo é uma condic¸ão necessária, mas não suficiente para o crescimento grupo empresarial por meio
a diversificac¸ão. Para prever a diversificac¸ão, a relac¸ão histórica deve ser somada com o interesse político governamental ou com o uso de um
u uma combinac¸ão de táticas políticas específicas da firma. Não foi encontrado nenhum conjunto de variáveis que possa explicar plenamente o
ministrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP.
 uma licenc¸a CC BY (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).rescimento via expansão.
 2017 Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Ad
ublicado por Elsevier Editora Ltda. Este e´ um artigo Open Access sob
alavras-chave: Grupos empresariais; Estratégia política; Diversificac¸ão∗ Corresponding author at: Rua Itapeva, 474, CEP 01331-000, São Paulo, SP, Brazil.
E-mail: abgama@gmail.com (M.A. Gama).
Peer Review under the responsibility of Departamento de Administrac¸ão, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸ão e Contabilidade da Universidade de
ão Paulo – FEA/USP.
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A business group is an organizational model in which a
et of legally independent firms are held together through a
table relationship, operating strategically in different sectors
nd under common control and ownership (Colpan & Hikino,
010; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Khanna & Yafeh, 2007). Authors
hat tried to explain why organizations grow as a group have
pproached the topic from several theoretical perspectives (Yiu,
u, Bruton, & Hoskisson, 2007). The mainstream theory – based
n transaction costs (Williamson, 1975, 1981) – argues that
rowth is necessary to expand groups’ internal markets, and
onsequently, to reduce their transaction costs. However, the
olitical economy approach (Aoki, 2001; Khanna & Fisman,
004; Schneider, 2009; Yiu et al., 2007) offers another explana-
ion for growth. According to this perspective, business groups
iversify and expand as a result of their use by governments for
romoting public policies. Therefore, the business group option
s a strategic fit to government requirements (Yiu et al., 2007),
nd a means to open or expand new sectors and markets that
erve both parties.
However, explanations proposed to date under the political
erspective have largely overlooked the conditions that under-
ie the growth of different types of business groups (Schneider,
009). Explanations that consider the business group to be an
conomic tool per se (Khanna & Fisman, 2004) focus on the
tate’s actions and their impact on group performance. As a
esult, there is still a limited number of studies on business
roups that provide empirical evidence as to the role played
y corporate political strategies in achieving diversification and
xpansion, among other conditions.
We contribute to this issue by showing that in the major-
ty of diversification cases, business groups have a historical
elationship with the government. However, this condition is
nsufficient; if business groups want to diversify, they need to use
ne or a combination of the following political tactics: long-term
ooperation contracts, lobbying, personal relationships, joint
enture with a state-owned firm, or a shareholding agreement
ith the government. On the other hand, when a business group
as a historical relationship with the government, which wants
o develop a specific sector, it provides stimulus and support to
he group, to encourage and enable diversification, without the
eed of a specific political tactics. Therefore, we propose the fol-
owing research question: How do companies and government
nteractions affect the growth decisions of business groups?
There are two dimensions of growth: (i) expansion – opening
f new plants, launching of new products and engaging in inter-
ationalization (Ansoff, 1965; Donato & Rosa, 2005; Kumar,
aur, & Pattnaik, 2012); and (ii) diversification – entering or
xiting new economic sectors or industries (Ansoff, 1965). Our
nalysis is oriented to diversification because it is the main fea-
ure of business groups (Yiu et al., 2007), while expansions are
onsidered as counterfactual.We tracked 17 examples of business groups’ growth in order
o report how it occurred, how relationships between government
nd groups were formed, and how eventual corporate political
&
ment Journal 53 (2018) 35–48
trategies were used, regarding these growth events. Our empir-
cal strategy was to perform an in-depth qualitative research,
y conducting 16 interviews with top-level managers, from six
ntentionally chosen Brazilian business groups and also with
ndustry experts. Additionally, we went through hundreds of sec-
ndary sources to deal with such a sensitive issue, as suggested
y Rama (2011), including news media, business groups’ annual
eports, government data available in official sites, and books
bout business groups’ history and their directors’ careers. From
hese sources, we created a description of each event, codified all
ata and compiled them using the software ATLAS.ti, to build
mpirical oriented categories that could represent the conditions
hat underlay the growth of business groups. Finally, we applied
ualitative Comparative Analysis – QCA (Ragin, 1987) to our
ategories, in order to assess multiple conjectural causations,
is-à-vis a case-sensitive approach (Fiss, 2011; Rihoux, 2006;
ihoux, Álamos-Concha, Bol, Marx, & Rezsöhazy, 2013).
iterature  review
he  growth  of  business  groups
A business group organizational format is defined as a group
f formally independent firms that operate in multiple sectors,
hich may or may not be related, and are under the common
ontrol of a family or people who have personal, trust-based
elationships with each other (Chang & Hong, 2000; Colpan
 Hikino, 2010; Granovetter, 1994; Khanna & Yafeh, 2007;
eff, 1978). Such groups are present in several countries and
eceive different names: “chaebol” in South Korea, “Keiretsu”
n Japan, “economic  groups” in Latin America, “the  twenty  two
amilies” (Granovetter, 1994) in Pakistan, “oligarchs” in Russia,
nd “QiyeJituan” (Lee & Kang, 2010) in China.
Although business groups once dominated the companies’
andscape of North America (Kandel, Kosenko, Morck, & Yafeh,
013), nowadays they are increasingly present in emerging coun-
ries, especially in response to market failures typical of such
conomies (Khanna & Palepu, 1997), and because of the high
evels of state intervention (Musacchio & Lazzarini, 2014).
There are six possible perspectives to address this subject.
he mainstream theory is the Transaction Cost Economics
Williamson, 1981); the others are Sociology (Granovetter,
994), Resourced-Based View (Guillén, 2000), Agency Theory
Yiu et al., 2013), Network Theory (Granovetter, 1983) and the
olitical Strategy Perspective. We include this last one because
istorically political issues had a strong influence on business
roups’ development, not only in Brazil but in South Korea,
taly, China and India (Aldrighi & Postali, 2010; Bresser-Pereira,
009; Mukhopadhyay & Chakrabortyb, 2017).
Few groups were large and diversified when founded.
rowth through expansion and diversification was and still is
he fundamental business group strategy (Bhatia & Thakur, Yafeh, 2005; Schneider, 2009). Political and policy issues
ostly explain the distinct sizes of business groups in different
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that political connections influenced non-related diversification
by firms in that country (Li et al., 2011). Results of an empiricalM.A. Gama et al. / RAUSP Ma
ountries. Diversification, on the other hand, is the result of deci-
ions to seek economies of scope and to reduce risk exposure
y holding subsidiaries with different market cycles (Schneider,
009). Choosing growth as a strategic objective may be the result
f political connections. In most cases, and especially in devel-
ping countries, political motivations influence business groups,
aking diversification more likely (Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998;
chneider, 2009; Yiu et al., 2007).
Business groups can grow by exploring markets and activities
hat may or not be related to the economic sector in which they
perate (Chang & Hong, 2000; Colpan & Hikino, 2010; Gra-
ovetter, 1994; Khanna & Yafeh, 2007; Leff, 1978). A business
roup might, for example, grow into a new sector with no previ-
us operation (Purkayastha & Lahiri, 2016), diversifying from
ivestock to construction; or it could seek growth within a sector
here it is already present, expanding from cattle slaughtering to
eather processing. Literature suggests that the decision to pur-
ue growth in related or unrelated sectors is highly influenced
y government actions (Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Schneider,
009).
The political economy approach emphasizes the relationship
etween government policy and the growth decisions of business
roups (Schneider, 1998, 2009). Evans (1995), Wade (1990),
nd Amsden (1989) argue that government plays a central role
n modeling firms’ growth and investment paths, by influencing
nd inducing businessmen to make investments that concern the
overnment, through the offer of selective subsidies and pro-
ection against foreign competition. In doing so, the group is
sed as a tool for accomplishing government’s political and
conomic goals (Yiu et al., 2007). Moreover, the presence of
ighly diversified business groups in a country’s economic sce-
ario is a useful way to promote public policies and industrial
evelopment (Khanna & Fisman, 2004).
Government choices can enable or constrain the operation of
roups. Incentives can range from direct promotion, by enabling
 specific group to enter a sector of interest to the government,
o indirect promotion, such as incentives for a whole sector,
hrough tax benefits and tariff protection (Schneider, 2009). The
imits can be the regulation of joint ventures and control over
ultinationals’ growth.
There is historical evidence on the influence of governments
n business groups (Khanna & Yafeh, 2007). One example,
mong others (Amatori, 1997; Guriev & Rachinsky, 2005;
hanna & Yafeh, 2007; Maman, 2002; Schneider, 2009), are
he Japanese keiretsu  groups that emerged after the war as a
esult of a government privatization program, and have expanded
nd diversified their activities in response to government con-
racts granted under special conditions (Shimotani, 1997). There
ere also periods in which governments have hampered business
roups rather than helped them. In Chile, during Pinochet’s term,
olicies toward free market and anti-concentration of property
 were adopted in 1973; in China, when the communist party
ained power in 1943, the result was hostility between gov-
rnment and business groups. Despite some negative periods
hroughout history, in general relationships between government
nd business groups have stimulated the economic development
f distinct sectors simultaneously (Colpan & Hikino, 2010).
r
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nteraction  of  business  groups  with  government
Governments have enough power to influence firms’ strategic
hoices, operations and processes (Pearce, 2001), but business
roups are not passive elements in this context. Therefore, there
s an interdependence and an ongoing exchange between groups’
ctions and government policies (Salisbury, 1969). Business
roups employ a variety of means to anticipate and influence
overnment decisions, to achieve their credibility and enhance
heir reputations, in order to achieve better performance and
ompetitive advantages (Bonardi, 2011).
The classification found in the literature specifies politi-
al strategies that involve the creation of political connections
Fisman, 2001), and the tactics that firms use to accomplish them
Hillman & Hitt, 1999). These strategies and tactics include:
i) an informational strategy achieved through lobbying or
ommissioned research projects; (ii) a financial incentive strat-
gy, implemented through contributions to political campaigns,
oliticians and/or parties, and paying for travel or personal ser-
ices (Bandeira-de-Mello & Marcon, 2011; Claessens, Feijen,
 Laeven, 2008); (iii) a constituency-building strategy, accom-
lished through public relations or advocacy advertising; (iv) a
trategy for building personal relations, implemented, for exam-
le, by hiring politicians for the board of directors (Faccio,
006); and (v) the tactics of businessmen participating in public
ife, which can be used to influence legislation, get privileged
nformation, and even influence government spending toward
heir companies.
Firms use a combination of resources to build their politi-
al strategies, to differentiate themselves and succeed (Bonardi,
011; Sojli & Tham, 2017; Tian, Hafsi, & Wu, 2007). In general,
hey use their growth to have access to politicians and to legisla-
ive and regulatory processes (Hillman, Zardkoohi, & Bierman,
999) and to receive preferential treatment (Faccio, 2006) and
asy access to funding (Claessens et al., 2008). Political con-
ections play an important role in the world’s largest economies
Fisman, 2001) and are present in firm-government relationships
n all countries (Faccio, 2006; Sojli & Tham, 2017). However,
olitical connections are most influential in emerging markets,
here the role of institutions is not fully developed, corruption
s more latent, and there are some restrictions to foreign invest-
ents (Faccio, 2006; Fisman, 2001; Li, He, Lan, & Yiu, 2011).
he way by which groups are formed facilitates the use of polit-
cal connections to favor some of their affiliated firms together
Bandeira-de-Mello, Marcon, Goldszmidt, & Zambaldi, 2012).
Many studies show that groups which have political connec-
ions enjoy greater benefits than those that do not (Claessens
t al., 2008; Faccio & Lang, 2002; Fisman, 2001; Sojli & Tham,
017). These benefits include access to funding, lower taxes
nd fees, and power over market regulation. Other studies show
hat political connections are linked to firms’ diversification into
ifferent sectors, and these connections depend on institutional
ssues. For example, a study of Chinese corporations showedesearch on Brazil show that politicians guarantee the growth of
usiness groups (Costa, Bandeira-de-Mello, & Marcon, 2013).
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ccording to a 2003 study conducted by the Inter-American
evelopment Bank, Latin America is more volatile regarding
olitics than Europe or Asia, and as a result of this weakness
usiness groups are offered greater incentives to grow in sec-
ors of interest to the government (Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998;
chneider, 2009).
To go beyond existing empirical contributions that show how
usiness groups can benefit from political connections, the gap
hat we address, in the political economy perspective, is a deeper
nvestigation on the set of conditions that underlie the two types
f business groups’ growth – expansion and diversification.
hese conditions and the relationship between them are analyzed
ogether.
esearch  design
We chose Brazil as the research setting for the following
easons: (a) the country provides an appropriate scenario for
his study because government is a relevant shareholder of
usiness groups (Schneider, 2009; Xavier, Marcon, & Bandeira-
e-Mello, 2013); (b) government plays a role either as a majority
r a minority shareholder; (c) it also takes part through stakes
eld by pension funds of state-controlled companies; (d) the rela-
ionship between companies and government is a phenomenon
ooted in the national culture (Aldrighi & Postali, 2010); and (e)
his relationship is seen as a normal state of affairs.
We chose qualitative methodology because the objective of
he study was to analyze in detail the conditions that enable
he growth of business groups. We compiled a list of business
roups that fit the following criteria: (i) groups listed on the
razilian Stock Market (BM&FBOVESPA) in 2011; and (ii)
roups included in a yearbook published by newspaper Valor
conômico  that lists the 200 largest groups that do business in
razil, along with their subsidiaries.1 Groups that met these cri-
eria (n  = 65) were classified using Schneider’s (2009) typology
f diversification, based on a measure of diversification varia-
ion (the Herfindahl Hirschman Index), and two classifications of
olitical connections, namely the presence of ex-politicians on
he board, as used by Camilo, Marcon, and Bandeira-de-Mello
2012), and corporate campaign donations, as used by Costa
t al. (2013). Our sample of six groups that agreed to participate
n the research comprises business groups that are highly diver-
ified and have made campaign donations. In compliance with
 confidentiality agreement, letters replaced the names of these
roups.2
The unit of analysis was the growth event, considered in two
imensions: (i) expansion, through the opening of new plants,
1
“200 Maiores Grandes Grupos, Valor”, available at: http://www.revistavalor.
om.br/home.aspx?pub=19&edicao=9.
2 In order to guarantee the necessary confidentiality, preserving the anonymity
f the interviewees and their groups, a non-disclosure agreement was signed
etween Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) and all Business Groups. As such,
ll interviewee’s names and their respective groups or entities were hidden as
uch as possible. We employed a system of codes to allow the relationships
etween individuals, groups, and the diversification or expansion events to be
stablished.
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ew products and overseas expansion (Ansoff, 1965; Donato &
osa, 2005; Kumar et al., 2012); and (ii) diversification, as the
ntry or exit of one of the business groups’ companies in new
conomic sectors (Ansoff, 1965). Seventeen incidents of diver-
ification or expansion were found and described. The study
s based on both primary and secondary data. To ensure valid-
ty and reliability, three rules were followed when collecting
nd organizing data: (i) the use of several sources of evidence
or each diversification or expansion event, enabling data tri-
ngulation (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2005); (ii) adherence to the
istorical sequence of facts in order to accurately describe what
as occurred; and (iii) creation of a database and a description
or each diversification or expansion event.3
One of the sources of evidence were interviews with represen-
atives of business groups and specialists in the subject. Table 2
ists the 16 interviewees, with brief descriptions of their jobs
nd careers up to the meeting date. We used a semi-structured
cript for defining the questions, and the average duration of
he interviews was one hour. The process began in June 2013
nd lasted until November 2013. We conducted 16 interviews,
ine of which were with members of the boards of the six busi-
ess groups, or their employees working in the Institutional
elations area, and seven with specialists. These profession-
ls are relevant to the analysis either because they work for the
overnment, or are consultants in governmental relations, or ex-
oliticians in the federal government, or former employees of the
ational Bank of Social and Economic Development (BNDES).
able 1 presents the list of interviewees and Table 2 the interview
uide.
We used a large number and a wide variety of secondary data
ources to validate data collected in the interviews (Rama, 2011).
he sources of secondary data were: (i) official documentation
bout the groups, since their creation up to the present; (ii) pub-
ished studies and evaluations dealing with the business groups
Costa et al., 2013; Xavier et al., 2013); (iii) newspaper articles
nd stories published in the media; (iv) economic and market
tudies and videos; (vi) data from the official websites of the
razilian Senate and the House of Representatives; (vii) data
rom the Superintendence for the Development of the Northeast
SUDENE) and BNDES websites; (viii) quantitative data used
n a study by Costa et al. (2013), to capture diversification and
olitical campaign donations; and (ix) quantitative data used by
amilo et al. (2012) to capture the presence of politicians in
roups’ boards. A total of 480 documents from 13 sources were
sed as secondary data.
We performed a three-stage data analysis. The first step was
o describe each individual incident of the group’s growth –
iversifications and expansions, using primary and secondary
ata. During this first analysis, Atlas.ti software proved invalu-
ble for organizing and encoding the data and making notes for
ach event. In the second stage, our main categories of anal-
sis (Table 3) emerged with a view for comparing the cases
3 In all examples, a capital letter indicates that the criterion exists/is met, while
 lower case letter indicates that the criterion is not present/is not met.
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Table 1
Details of interviews.
Interviewee code Date Experience
INT 1 June/13 Manager of relationship with investors, has worked for business group B for 10 years.
INT 2 July/13 International director, works directly with CEO, 10 years in this position. Group B.
INT 3 August/13 Managing director and marketing director of business group A. Responsible for institutional relations and
institutional demands. Four years in this position.
INT 4 July/13 Institutional relations manager. Three years in this position; responsible for the development of this area
in Group C.
INT 5 August/13 Institutional relations manager. Two years in this position and six years working in the group. Group F.
INT 6 August/13 Director of institutional relations. 15 years of experience in this area. Has worked for the group for six
years. Group F.
INT 7 September/13 CEO of the group’s holding company. 10 years working in Group E.
INT 8 August/13 Institutional relations director. Has worked for the group for 15 years, and in this position for one year.
Group D.
INT 9 August/13 Director of a consulting firm that works for big companies, as a bridge between public banks and
companies.
INT 10 August/13 Has worked for 40 years in the government as institutional relations specialist.
INT 11 August/13 Institutional relations specialist. Has worked for 10 years with multinationals and business groups,
associations, and the government, as a facilitator in public policy matters.
INT 12 September/13 Owner of a public relations consulting firm for seven years.
INT 13 September/13 Worked for many years in the federal government. Currently, president of an economic consulting firm
and member of directors’ board of several business groups.
INT 14 October/13 Consultant. Former employee of a public financing institution. Has been in this institution for three years.
INT 15 October/13 Works as director of the main subsidiary of a business group, responsible for government relations.
INT 16 November/13 Chairman of the Board of Directors and entrepreneur. Worked for more than 30 years in one business
group, is currently in another.
Notes: Interviewees INT 1 through INT 8, INT 13, INT 15 and INT 16 are all represen
13 is both.
Table 2
Interview guide.
Questions
1. What is the structure of the business group?
2. How do business groups’ firms compete in their industries?
3. How is the decision making process in a new business?
4. Could you give us examples of investments that have increased or
decreased business group’s diversification?
5. Could you give us examples of the group’s institutional relations?
6. Which are the main activities of institutional relations with the
government?
7. Could you give us examples of investments in new industries, in which
the institutional relationship with the government has helped or
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In some events, a group started a process of diversificationmbarrassed the investment decision?
Eisenhardt, 1989). Finally, we used QCA method as a means to
elate the empirical categories to the outcome of interest (Fiss,
007). We chose QCA (Ragin, 1987) to guide our analysis for
 number of reasons, such as: (i) QCA allows the use of a small
umber of cases to accomplish objectives, which includes test-
ng the necessary and sufficient conditions of specific situations
Ragin, 2006); (ii) the methods used in QCA research employ
he principles of logic to compare cases; (iii) QCA is appropriate
or analyzing models that involve many interacting factors, to
est hypotheses that predict if multiple conditions will operate
ogether (Longest & Vaisey, 2008). As such, QCA can address
ituations in which an outcome has multiple causes. We used
he statistical program Stata 12.0 and the fuzzy package for set
anipulation (Longest & Vaisey, 2008) to perform QCA anal-
sis. We used crisp sets (0/1) to define which cases did or did
o
u
3tatives of business groups; INT 9 through INT 14 are all industry experts. INT
ot fulfill specific conditions and outcomes. Table 3 also lists
he data codes.
We employed the crisp sets analysis procedure described by
ongest and Vaisey (2008). Fourth section presents the results
f the study.
esults
Our findings are presented across two sections. In the first,
e describe the 17 growth events of the business groups. In the
econd section, we describe the QCA analysis, showing the sets
f conditions used by business groups to achieve diversification
r expansion.
escription  of  growth  events
The descriptions of groups’ growth through government
ncentives and groups’ political strategies are based on exten-
ive analysis of interviews and secondary data. When a single
roup had experienced more than one diversification or expan-
ion event, we isolated each event as a single unit of analysis.
nterviewees described groups’ political strategies for each unit
f analysis, explaining how their groups operated in each spe-
ific situation. Furthermore, we also searched for secondary data
hat could provide relevant additional facts for understanding the
ature of the relationships between groups and government.r expansion, whose origin was a governmental action that set
p incentives for the group to grow. For example, growth event
, a diversification, was the entry of group B into the energy
40 M.A. Gama et al. / RAUSP Management Journal 53 (2018) 35–48
Table 3
Sets, definitions, encoding of conditions and outcomes.
Condition/outcome sets Definition Encoding
Growth strategy (outcome symbol: Y)
Y: Diversification
Y: Expansion
Diversification: entry into new sectors
Expansion: portfolio expansion, new product development,
internationalization, plant expansion
(Ansoff, 1965; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Donato & Rosa,
2005; Kumar et al., 2012; Schneider, 2009)
1:Diversification
0: Expansion
Origin of growth (condition symbol: O)
O: Government
o: Business Group
The origin of the diversification or expansion situation:
government or business group
1: Government
0: Business Group
Historical relationship with government
(condition symbol: R)
R: Present
r: Absent
The historical influence of the government on group’s
development (Bonelli, 1998; Bresser-Pereira, 2009;
Caldeira, 2012; Queiroz, 1972; Schneider, 2009)
1: Historical relationship present
0: Historical relationship absent
Business group diversification (condition
symbol: N)
N: >6 sectors
n: ≤6 sectors
Number of sectors in which the group has businesses
(Xavier et al., 2013)
1: more than six sectors
0: six sectors or fewer
Specific political tactics (condition symbol: P)
P: Present
p: Absent
Long term cooperation contract; purchase agreement;
lobbying; personal relationship; commissioned research
projects; contributions to politicians or party; paid travel or
personal service; public relations or advocacy
advertisement; corporate donations to political campaigns;
hiring politicians for the board; participation of
businessmen in public life; joint venture with state-owned
company; shareholding agreement with the government
(Guillén, 2000; Hoskisson, Johnson, Tihanyi, & White,
2005; Johnson & Amsden, 2001; Kock, Guillén, & Hall,
1: Use of specific tactics to achieve political
strategies
0: Absence of specific tactics to achieve political
strategies
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ector. Group B used financial incentives as political strategy
Hillman & Hitt, 1999) – for example, campaign donations
nd personal services and the information strategy (Hillman &
itt, 1999) – ex-politician on the group’s board. Group B has
 strong historical relationship with the government and is the
argest group in the sample. Prior to growth event 3, it already
perated in the agribusiness, textiles, logistics, construction,
eal-estate developments and finance sectors. In 2001, Brazil-
an economy recorded a lower growth than expected, due to
lectricity rationing, and that same year government chose this
roup as the only beneficiary of the Priority Program for Ther-
oelectricity (PPT), which guaranteed access to natural gas at
ow prices for 20 years. As such, this diversification originated in
he government. In addition, the group also received warranties
hat energy generated by their plants would be purchased by the
overnment for that same period.
Another example is the expansion of a plant in the Northeast
f Brazil, that belongs to group C. The group used the political
trategy of financial incentives, which included campaign dona-
ions and hiring personal services. The decision to expand in the
ortheast was taken because the family that controlled the group
ad real estate investments in the region and a close and long-
tanding relationship with the local government, which aroused
nterest in developing an industrial plant. Hence, this growth
vent originated in the group. In 2008, a long-term cooperation
greement was signed with the local government, which set out
lans to improve industry development in the region. The group
ade direct contact with three local State Secretaries: Trade
nd Industry, Treasury and Environment, and Public Security.
(
o
(n 2010, a cheap credit line from BNDES (Program for Invest-
ent’s Sustainability) was approved, giving access to R$ 2.7
illion. Additionally, the state where the factory was located
as SUDENE’s territory and, as such, industries in that region
ere entitled to a fiscal incentive of 74% exemption of income
ax, along with another exemption known as Addition to Freight
or the Renovation of Merchant Navy (AFRMM).
Table 4 describes the 17 diversification or expansion events,
ncluding the political strategies used by the business groups
nvolved, and the set of conditions that accompanied growth.
nalyzing  business  groups’  growth
We first built the best-fit model for group observations with
he current conditions, using all possible combinations. As
hown in Table 5, the best fit was found with the Y set (diversi-
cation vs. expansion). Data reveal that two groups were most
ommon. Group one (RNOp), with five observations, presents
he following combination of conditions: historical relationship
ith government: present (R); number of sectors: greater than
ix (N); origin of growth: government (O); and specific tactics
o achieve political strategy: absent (p). Group two (rnoP), also
ith five observations, has the opposite configuration, where
elationship, sector and origin were all absent (rno), but the use
f specific tactics to accomplish political strategy was present
P).
The following step in data analysis sought to provide a sense
f the overlap between outcomes and the set of conditions
Longest & Vaisey, 2008, p. 93). This was achieved using two
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Table 4
Description of growth events of business groups.
Group Sectors of activities Political strategies often employed Events Description of diversification or
expansion
Set of conditions linked to growth
A
(1) Agriculture, forestry, logging; (2)
trade; (3) parts and accessories for
motor vehicles; (4) financial
intermediation and insurance; (5)
transportation, storage, and postal
services; (6) other services
Financial incentive strategy:
campaign donation; personal services
(1) Reforestation sector Origin of this diversification was a
government initiative to develop the
region through tax incentives. Group
A was the first group to diversify in
this region
Origin: Government; Number of
sectors: 6; Specific political tactics:
absent; Historical relationship:
absent.
rnOp
(2) Seaport Business group started this
diversification due to the need to
export timber. In 2009 group asked
for government support in the form
of a long-term cooperation.
Project was financed by a public
pension fund – PREVI, with cheap
credit. Group received R$ 750
million in support from the federal
government. Moreover, local
government backed the project by
improving local infrastructure.
Origin: business group;
Number of sectors: 6; specific
political tactics: long-term
cooperation contract; historical
relationship: absent.
rnoP
B
(1) Textile; (2) clothes and
accessories; (3) agriculture, forestry,
and logging; (4) electricity and gas;
(5) construction; (6) real-estate
services; (7) financial intermediation
and insurance; (8) services to
companies
Financial incentive strategy:
campaign donation; personal
services; information strategy:
ex-politician on group’s board
(3) Energy sector Group has a strong historical
relationship with government. It is
the largest group in the sample. In
2001, Brazilian economy had grown
less than expected due to electricity
rationing. Due to a personal
relationship, group diversified into
the energy sector. Government
originated this diversification, by
choosing the group for a program to
stimulate electricity generation,
which gave the group access to
natural gas for 20 years, at low prices.
Origin government;
Number of sectors: 8; specific
political tactics: absent; historical
relationship: present.
RNOp
(9) Internationalization of the textile
sector and entry into retail
The origin of this diversification was
the group’s interest for growing.
Entry in the U.S. market took place
through a partnership with a local
manufacturer. The group was
supported in this effort by cheap
credit from BNDES-Exim, which
provided U$ 40 million for a
distribution center in that country.
Business group participates in
Brazil-USA CEOs’ forum, which
facilitated relationships and business
development in that country.
Origin: business group; number of
sectors: 8; specific political tactics:
lobbying; historical relationship:
present
RNoP
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Table 4
(Continued)
Group Sectors of activities Political strategies often employed Events Description of diversification or expansion Set of conditions linked to growth
(14) Factory in the Northeast of
Brazil
The origin of this diversification was the
group’s owner, and his business partner was
a congressman. They asked for SUDENE’s
support to build the factory. In 1967,
SUDENE and Minas Gerais Development
Bank (BDMG) granted a loan of U$ 22.5
million of the 30 million needed
Origin: business group;
Number of sectors: 8 sectors; specific
political tactics: lobbying and
personal relationship; historical
relationship: present
RNoP
(15) Factory in the Northeast of
Brazil
The government, through BNDES, was the
origin of this expansion. The group had
personal relationships with politicians. In
1983, BNDES invited the group to take over
the assets of a company that had gone
bankrupt. This expansion was supported by
SUDENE, BDMG and Northeast tax
incentives.
Origin: government; number of
sectors: 8; specific political tactics:
absent; historical relationship:
present
RNOp
(16) Clothing and accessories The origin of this diversification was the
local government. The governor of one of
the states in the Northeast of Brazil donated
land to the group in an inner city of the state
to build the new factory.
Origin: government; number of
sectors: 8; specific political tactics:
absent; historical relationship:
present
RNOp
C
(1) Energy and gas; (2) pulp and
paper; (3) financial intermediation
and insurance; (4) chemical; (5)
transportation, storage, and postal
services; and (6) services to business
Financial Incentive Strategy:
campaign donation; personal
services;
(4) Energy sector One of the largest groups in the sample.
Origin of this diversification was the group’s
interest in the energy sector. The group
signed a long-term cooperation agreement
with the government, and received
investments and tax benefits.
Origin: business group; number of
sectors: 6; specific political tactics:
long-term cooperation contract;
historical relationship: present
Rnop
(5) Chemical sector The origin of this diversification was the
federal government. Group had a partnership
with other companies of the sector and
BNDESPar, in a project to create an
industrial pole in the Southeast of Brazil.
Another group, controlled by the federal
government, offered R$ 2.7 billion to buy the
group’s chemical arm (valued at R$ 1
billion) and got it
Origin: government; number of
sectors: 6; specific political tactics:
absent; historical relationship:
present
RnOp
(12) Cellulose pulp factory in the
Northeast of Brazil
The origin of this expansion was the group,
which developed a relationship with federal
and local governments to stimulate growth.
There were family relationships between
firm and state government, and a long-term
contract was signed; state government
offered special conditions for building the
factory in the state
Origin: business group; number of
sectors: 6; specific political tactics:
lobbying; personal relationship;
long-term contract; historical
relationship: present
RnoP
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Table 4
(Continued)
Group Sectors of activities Political strategies often employed Events Description of diversification or
expansion
Set of conditions linked to growth
(11) Pulp factory in the Northeast of
Brazil
A joint venture with BNDES. The
origin of this expansion event was the
business group; BNDES holds 27%
of the preferential shares in one of
the group companies; a long-term
contract was signed with state
government, which offered special
conditions for building the factory in
the state. This expansion received
federal tax incentives with a 75%
exemption of income tax
Origin: business group; number of
sectors: 6; specific political tactics:
shareholding agreement with
government; long-term contract;
personal relationship; historical
relationship: present
RnoP
D
(1) Rubber and plastic; (2) parts and
accessories for motor vehicles; (3)
trade; (4) maintenance and repair of
machinery; (5) chemicals; and (6)
trucks and buses
Financial incentive strategy:
campaign donation; personal services
(6) Financial sector The origin of this diversification was
the group, which opened a bank to
finance its final customers. In order
to get credit approval from BNDES,
the group started to act as a direct
representative of the bank in the
market.
Origin: business group; number of
sectors: 6; specific political tactics:
joint-venture with state-owned firm;
long-term contract; historical
relationship: absent
rnoP
(8) Internationalization to Egypt The origin of this expansion was the
group’s interest in
internationalization. Group
approached federal government
through an industry association, thus
developing a relationship, which led
to financial support from BNDES.
Origin: business group; number of
sectors: 6; specific political tactics:
lobbying; historical relationship:
absent
rnoP
(10) Portfolio product The origin of this expansion was the
group. It developed a relationship
with the federal government, through
an industry association and a
personal relationship, which lobbied
the government to convince it t to
acquire a customized product for
serving the rural population. Group
was supported by BNDES, which
financed the program, and received
tax incentives and exemptions.
Origin: business group; number of
sectors: 6; specific political tactics:
lobbying; personal relationship;
historical relationship: absent
rnoP
E
(1) Machinery and equipment,
including maintenance and repairs;
(2) trade; (3) transport; (4) financial
intermediation and insurance; (5)
information services; (6) services to
businesses; (7) repair and
maintenance services; and (8)
electronic material and
communication equipment
Financial incentive strategy:
campaign donation; personal
services; information strategy:
ex-politician on the group’s board
(7) Electronic and communication
equipment
Business group, one of the largest in
our sample, has a strong historical
relationship with the government.
Group entered the satellite industry
through a joint venture with a
state-owned firm. The origin of this
diversification was the federal
government’s National Program for
Space Activities, through a direct
request for a project that developed a
geostationary satellite.
Origin: government; number of
sectors: 8; specific political tactics:
joint-venture with state-owned firm;
historical relationship: present
RNOP
44
 
M
.A.
 G
am
a
 et
 al.
 /
 RAU
SP
 M
anag
em
ent
 Jo
u
rn
al
 53
 (2018)
 35–48
Table 4
(Continued)
Group Sectors of activities Political strategies often employed Events Description of diversification or
expansion
Set of conditions linked to growth
(17) Equipment and machinery Business group entered the
submarine sector through partnership
with a small Brazilian enterprise with
expertise in nuclear generation of
electricity. This enabled the group to
participate in a Brazilian Navy
project. The origin of this
diversification was the government.
Origin: government; number of
sectors: 8; specific political tactics:
absent historical relationship: present
RNOp
F (1) Perfumery, hygiene, and
cleaning; (2) transport; (3)
information services; and (4)
agriculture, forestry, and extractive
Information strategy: lobbying (16) Expansion: increased product
portfolio through the opening of two
factories in the North of Brazil
The origin of this expansion was the
business group. It approached federal
and local governments, built
relationships with politicians to
enable the project, and developed
public policies in the region; received
tax exemption and benefits, along
with permits from environmental
authorities. Through a long-term
contract, the group got tax reductions
for all of the factories’ products.
Origin: business group; number of
sectors: 4; specific political tactics:
lobbying; long-term contract;
historical relationship: absent
rnoP
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Table 5
Best fit for Y set.
Best fit Freq. Percent Cum.
RNOp 5 29.41 29.41
RNoP 2 11.76 41.18
RnOp 1 5.88 47.06
RnoP 3 17.65 64.71
rnOp 1 5.88 70.59
rnoP 5 29.41 100.00
Total 17 100.00
Notes: Capital letters indicate that the attribute is present and lower case letters
indicate its absence. R, historical relationship with government; N, group active
in more than six sectors; O, growth event originated in government; P, use of
specific political tactics.
Table 6
Coincidence matrix.
Y R N O P
Y 1.000
R 0.467 1.000
N 0.385 0.636 1.000
O 0.385 0.500 0.556 1.000
P 0.400 0.312 0.133 0.000 1.000
Notes: Capital letters indicate that the characteristic is present and lower case
letters indicate its absence. Y, growth through diversification; R, historical rela-
tionship with government; N, group active in more than six sectors; O, growth
event originated by government; P, use of specific political tactics.
Table 7
Sufficiency and necessity matrix.
Y R N O P
Y 1.000 0.636 0.455 0.455 0.545
R 0.636 1.000 0.636 0.545 0.455
N 0.714 1.000 1.000 0.714 0.286
O 0.714 0.857 0.714 1.000 0.000
P 0.600 0.500 0.200 0.000 1.000
Notes: Y, growth through diversification; R, historical relationship with govern-
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Table 8
Final reduction sets – coverage and consistency.
Solution Set Raw coverage Unique coverage Solution Consistency
1 n*o*P 0.364 0.273 0.500
2 n*O*p 0.182 0.091 1.000
3 R*o*P 0.273 0.182 0.600
4 R*O*p 0.364 0.273 0.667
Total coverage = 1.000/solution consistency = 0.647.
Notes: R, historical relationship with government; n, group active in 6 sectors or
fewer; o, growth event originated by business group; O, growth event originated
by government; P, use of specific political tactics; p, no use of specific political
tactics.
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bent; N, group active in more than six sectors; O, growth event originated in
overnment; P, use of specific political tactics.
atrices: a coincidence matrix and a sufficiency and necessity
atrix. As can be observed in Table 6, the highest degree of
verlap was between a historical relationship with government
nd involvement in more than six sectors, with coverage of 64%.
The sufficiency and necessity matrix (Table 7) shows which
ingle set is most likely to predict another single set. By focus-
ng on the outcome Y  (diversification), we observed that two
ets have equal scores (0.714). Specifically, groups active in
ore than six business sectors (N) and situations in which the
rigin of growth was the government (O) indicate diversifica-
ion. With regard to the relationships between condition sets,
e noted that a number of sectors greater than six is capable of
ntirely predicting a historical relationship with the government
1.000).We tested the sufficiency of all observed configurations of R,
, O  and P  against our outcome (Y). We interpreted test results
n accordance with the premises set out by Ragin, who stated
b
“hat “consistency scores should be as close to 1.0 (perfect consis-
ency) as possible. With observed consistency scores below 0.75,
t becomes increasingly difficult on substantive grounds to main-
ain that a subset relation exists” (Ragin, 2006, p. 293). Three of
he tests (Y-Consistency against N-Consistency, Y-Consistency
gainst All Other Y-Consistency, and Y-Consistency against Set
alue) returned consistency levels equal to 0.600, for solutions
ith more than two observations. This is an average result for
onsistency in our model.
Longest and Vaisey (2008) propose that the subsequent step
s to verify common solutions and reduce them to a short logical
ecipe. For our data, the “common” command returned the fol-
owing list of combinations: rnoP, rnOp, RnoP, RnOp, RNoP
nd, RNOp.4 We then used the “reduce” command to achieve a
educed final solution set and its accompanying coverage statis-
ics (Longest & Vaisey, 2008). Table 8 shows the output of this
rocess.
As shown in Table 8, results exhibit medium solution consis-
ency for four minimum configuration sets. We can extract some
ogical statements from the final four solutions. When growth
riginated in the government, the absence of specific tactics
o achieve political strategies was always part of the solution.
n contrast, when growth originated in the group, the pres-
nce of specific tactics to achieve political strategies was always
bserved. This reverse overlap shows that origin of growth and
se of a specific political strategy are empirically incompatible
onditions for diversification, according to our data. Although
ne or other of these combinations (o*P  and O*p) appear in all
olutions, they, alone, could not predict Y. Each of them was
bserved twice, in combination with a number of sectors less
han or equal to six, and presence of relationship with the gov-
rnment. Finally, it is possible to state, in logical terms, that o*P
nd O*p  are necessary but insufficient conditions to generate
, since they must be combined with either n or R  to result in
rowth through diversification.
In the next section we discuss some of the theoretical contri-
utions that can be drawn from our analysis.4 The following theoretically possible logical combinations were excluded
ecause they did not occur in any of the empirical observations: “rnop”, “rnOP”,
rNop”, “rNoP”, “rNOp”, “Rnop”, “Rnop”, “RnOP”, “RNop” and “RNOP”.
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iscussion
Despite the growing interest in the role that political strategies
lay in business groups’ growth, we do not yet know which con-
itions underlie different types of growth (Schneider, 2009). In
ur study data shows the existence of historical relationship with
overnment, origin of growth (whether initiated in the group or
n the government), degree of business group diversification, in
erms of number of different sectors, and use of a political strat-
gy as conditions that may be necessary or sufficient for growth
hrough diversification into new markets, with the expansion of
xisting operations as counterfactual.
The first and third solutions seem to extend ideas related to
he antecedents proposed by Hillman, Keim, and Schuler (2004),
egarding growth via diversification; these authors proposed that
he higher the firm’s level of diversification, more likely the
rm will use an on-going relational approach to corporate polit-
cal activity. The use of specific tactics for political strategy,
ombined with the decision to grow originating in the group,
ather than in the government, is another important contribu-
ion aligned with existing literature. Business groups diversify
ecause they want to become large enough to exert influence
n governmental actions (Schneider, 2009). If a business group
ntends to grow, but does not use specific tactics for political
trategy, it will be more difficult to diversify, and harder to
nfluence government actions. The tactics for achieving polit-
cal strategy that we have mentioned in this paper are already
nown (Baron, 1995; Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Hillman et al., 2004;
liver & Holzinger, 2008); but the contribution of this research
s to demonstrate that the use of specific tactics to achieve polit-
cal strategies leads to business groups’ diversification, if they
re taken together with other conditions, such as the government
ot being the origin of growth, and the group keeping a historical
elationship with the government.
Despite difficulties that hamper the measurement of direct
ffects of political strategy, because it has a complex set of vari-
bles (Hillman et al., 2004), we were able to identify some
mportant tactics used to achieve business groups’ diversifi-
ation. For example, in event 9 the political strategy tactics
as lobbying. Used in combination with the political strate-
ies commonly employed by the group – the financial incentive
trategy (campaign donations and personal services), the infor-
ation strategy, and the strategy of building personal relations,
y appointing ex-politicians to the group’s board (Hillman &
itt, 1999) – it proved possible to diversify. Another example
as event 14, in which the tactics for political strategies were
obbying and personal relationships, which, combined with the
ame other strategies mentioned above, enabled diversification.
Based on solution 4, it is reasonable to assume that govern-
ents will select business groups whose relationship strategy
ests on long-term ties of trust. These trusted partners will help
hem implement public policies, compensate for market fail-
res (Khanna & Palepu, 1997) and achieve their political goals
Yiu et al., 2007). At the same time, in exchange, the business
roup wants to have access to subsidies and protection against
oreign competition (Evans, 1995; Wade, 1990), while increas-
ng its sales and profits. Moreover, the historical relationship
Aent Journal 53 (2018) 35–48
etween business groups and government in Brazil is accepted
s a phenomenon rooted in national culture (Aldrighi & Postali,
010; Bonelli, 1998), for which there is plenty of evidence in
he history of Brazilian business groups. According to 2007 data,
f the 29 largest Brazilian business groups 18 were founded in
he 1960s. From this set, 14 began as state-owned companies,
nd nine of them had since been privatized (Aldrighi & Postali,
010).
Solution 2 highlights the fact that if governments initiate
ctions, it is unnecessary for a business group to employ any
pecific political tactics, even when the group has a low level
f diversification. Diversification event 5, described in Table 4,
s an example of this set of conditions that generate the out-
ome explained above. In our view, it is plausible to say that
he government chooses a business group to enter new sec-
ors, giving less priority to market leaders. Literature states that
merging economies’ environment stimulates not only diversifi-
ation of small business groups, but also unrelated diversification
Guillén, 2000). While literature suggests that governments
nfluence the growth of business groups (Schneider, 2009), it
ddresses the subject generically. We help to fill this gap by
xplaining how it takes place, suggesting that business groups
hat have a historical relationship with the government usually
ely on governmental actions to ensure diversification.
onclusion
This research contributes to studies of political strategy and
usiness groups (Bandeira-de-Mello & Marcon, 2011; Costa
t al., 2013; Queiroz, 1972; Schneider, 2009; Xavier et al., 2013),
y providing an explanation and an empirical demonstration of
he conditions that underlie the growth of groups. We found that
here is a necessary set of conditions for growth through diver-
ification. First, a historical relationship between the business
roup and the government is an important condition for growth.
n addition, it can be combined with specific tactics of political
trategies or with government initiative to support the business
roup’s growth via diversification. Future research should use
he categories that emerged in this paper as conditions, and test
hem in different contexts, in order to verify if they also explain
he growth of business groups.
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